Professor Lynn McLain to MD Legislature: "These bills fall far short of the national standard for criminal penalties for failure to report child abuse." #sexualabuse #failuretoreport @SenMikeMiller

SB 568 RE: FAILURE TO REPORT CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

Testimony in Opposition

Respectfully Submitted by Lynn McLain, Professor and Dean Joseph Curtis Faculty Fellow Emerita, University of Baltimore School of Law, March 22, 2019

HONORABLE CHAIRMAN CLIPPINGER, VICE-CHAIR ATTERBEARY, AND COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

These bills fall far short of the national standard for criminal penalties for failure to report child abuse. None of the 48 states or D.C. has anything coming close to the total lack of remedy these bills offer, especially in sexual abuse cases.

1. Unlike the penalty laws in 48 other states and D.C., both SB 568 (and HB 787, as amended) apply only if the mandatory reporter who failed to report can be proved to have had "actual knowledge of the abuse or neglect."

The courts will look to the "plain meaning" of these words¹ -- which is firsthand, direct knowledge of the facts at issue. In the child abuse and neglect context, this would mean personally witnessing the acts of abuse or neglect as they were being committed, and realizing that it was abuse, as opposed to, for example, "horsing around."

Black's Law Dictionary² defines "actual knowledge" as "Direct and clear knowledge, as distinguished from constructive knowledge (the employer, having witnessed the accident, had actual knowledge of the worker's injury). "³

Black's defines "constructive knowledge," in contrast, as "Knowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person." A mandated Family Law 5-704 reporter is much more likely to have "constructive knowledge "of abuse than "actual knowledge."

Only "constructive knowledge" would result from hearing allegations of abuse or neglect from the child or seeing bruises, vaginal or anal tearing, or other injuries which cause the reporter to suspect abuse. In those situations, the mandated reporter would have a duty to report "suspected abuse" under Family Law 5-704. But that reporter would not have "actual knowledge" of the abuse or neglect, so even an intentional failure to report, as part of an intentional cover-up, could not be charged under these current bills.

These bills would not cover situations such as where persons at the US Olympics Committee or Michigan State University were told of allegations by minor gymnasts that they had been abused by Dr. Larry Nassar, even if they had spoken directly to the gymnasts.⁴

These bills would not even cover anyone in the most extreme example of the Penn State scandal -- the assistant coach who saw Mr. Sandusky in the shower with the young boy said that he was not sure that it was sexual abuse, but he thought it might be. So even he could not have been prosecuted successfully under this Maryland bill, if the jury had reasonable doubt as to whether he really knew it was sexual abuse! Let alone the higher-ups to whom that man reported but who failed to act. They were held criminally liable under Pennsylvania law -- but they couldn't have been charged if these Maryland bills were the governing law.

2. Because these bills do not state otherwise, the statute of limitations under them is one year from the initial failure to report. Most sexual abuse does not come to light until much, much later. Those who intentionally failed to report child sexual abuse and covered it up for over a year would get away with it "scot-free."

These bills create a misdemeanor. Under Courts 5-106(a), the default statute of limitations for all misdemeanors is one year. To give a different statute of limitations, the particular misdemeanor must be either explicitly made "subject to Courts 5-106(b)" or have a separate statute of limitations provided for in a new subsection of Courts 5-106.

3. These bills undermine the current reporting structure established by Family Law 5-704 and 5-705, which have been construed as applying even when the reporter learns of the suspected abuse or neglect when the child has reached adulthood.⁵ Reports to Social Services or law enforcement are still required, so that the State authorities can investigate to determine whether there are other children who may be at risk. ⁶

Instead, these bills choose to leave at risk innumerable other children in an abuser's sphere.

4. Unlike the laws of 35 other states, these bills inexplicably do not cover bishops and other clergy who fail to promptly report suspected abuse or neglect.

For these reasons, I respectfully oppose SB 568 and HB 787 as amended.

Lynn McLain

lmclain@ubalt.edu

410-778-4515

1 Breslin v. Powell, 421 Md. 266, 286-87 (2011) ("In attempting to discern the intent of the Legislature, courts 'look first to the plain language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. ' If the language of thestatute is clear and ambiguous, courts will give effect to the plain meaning of the statute....").

2 10th ed. 2014.

3 In numerous Maryland statutes, too, "actual knowledge" is used to mean direct, firsthand knowledge of the fact at issue, in contrast to lower alternative standards, such as "a reasonable basis for knowledge." Where lesser alternatives are permitted, they are listed with the use of the disjunctive "or." See, e.g., Md. Code, Crim. L. 11-209(a) ("A person may not [do act X]..., if the person knows, or possesses facts under which the person reasonably should know...").

4 See, e.g., Gymnasts Fault Olympic Committee, Wall St. J., A3, col. 1, Feb. 20, 2018.

5 78 Md. Op. Atty. Gen. 189 (Dec. 3, 1993).

6 See L. McLain, vol. 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL sec. 504:2 at nn. 44-48 (3d ed. 2013).

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